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AVOIDANCE MANEUVERS SELECTED WHILE VIEWING COCKPIT TRAFFIC DISPLAYS
J. D. Smith, Stephen R. Ellis, and Edward Lee*
Ames Research Center
SUMMARY
Ten airline pilots rated the collision danger of air traffic presented on cock-
pit displays of traffic information (CDTI) while they monitored simulated departures
from Denver. They selected avoidance maneuvers when necessary for separation. Most
" evasive maneuvers were turns rather than vertical maneuvers. Evasive maneuvers
chosen for encounters with low or moderate collision danger were generally toward the
intruding aircraft. This tendency lessened as the perceived threat level increased.
In the highest threat situations pilots turned toward the intruder only at chance
levels. Intruders coming from positions in front of the pilot's own ship were more
frequently avoided by turns toward than when intruders approached laterally or from
behind. Some of the implications of the pilots' turning-toward tendencies are dis-
cussed with respect to automatic collision avoidance systems and coordination of
avoidance maneuvers of conflicting aircraft.
INTRODUCTION
Advances in aviation electronics make CDTI (cockpit displays of traffic informa-
tion) a possible solution to congestion problems caused by current and projected air
traffic (refs. I and 2). One of the possible roles of CDTI may be as a backup to the
current air traffic control system. But CDTI may additionally provide a means of
increasing safety, capacity, and efficiency of air traffic flow (ref. 3). The safety
of this flow could be enhanced through improved pilot traffic monitoring, reduced
emergency reaction times, and improved detection of blunders, such as altitude
deviations. These goals might be achieved, for example, through better use of the
"see and avoid" rule in visual flight rule (VFR) conditions; CDTI could help locate
traffic out the window. Similarly, air traffic capacity and efficiency could be
improved through the use of CDTI, since its use could allow more precise pilot-
controlled spacing, merging, and tactical maneuvering to resolve potential traffic
conflicts, thus helping pilots achieve optimum trajectories and reduced separation in
coordination with other traffic.
Various questions have been raised, however, concerning problems posed by the
introduction of CDTI systems. Pilot workload might increase (ref. 4). Pilot-
controller conflicts might arise during the resolution of air traffic threats. Pilots
might become unduly fascinated with CDTI and distracted from other cockpit duties.
And finally, CDTI might interfere with pilot responses to collision avoidance systems
also present in the cockpit (ref. 5).
Furthermore, since incorporation of pilot avoidance patterns into the collision
avoidance logic could help reduce the conflict between pilots and automatic systems,
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the understanding of pilot biases while using CDTI would be of value in the design of
such logic. For example, collision avoidance systems have been designed previously
to maximize separation between aircraft, e.g., ATARS (ref. 6); however, pilot avoid-
ance patterns may conflict with such a pure separation criterion (refs. 5 and 7).
Accordingly, any evaluation of CDTI for assisting the air traffic control process
requires an investigation of pilot decisionmaking in conjunction with the use of CDTI
in a wide variety of air traffic situations. The following experiment is a continua-
tion of a series of experiments investigating pilot evasive maneuvers when the pilot
is confronted with conflicting traffic on CDTI (refs. 5 and 8). The experiment was
primarily designed to provide new data concerning the effect of the pilot's subjective
perception of collision danger when monitoring an encounter with conflicting traffic.
Objective parameters, such as relative speeds, heading difference, altitude, and miss
distance, determine the physical characteristics of such encounters. Subjective
factors such as perceived collision danger are only partly a function of the physical
situation and provide a separate influence on the pilots' maneuvers.
In the following experiment, the subjective aspect of the encounter was investi-
gated by examining the effect of presenting geometrically identical encounters on
displays with different map ranges. We were particularly interested in the effect of
different map ranges because for any given actual separation in the airspace the
larger map range brings aircraft closer together on the face of the display. Thus,
increase in map range conceivably could produce artificial increases in perceived
collision danger by creating a false sense of close proximity of nearby aircraft. We
chose to provide all displayed aircraft with constant time predictors since previous
research (ref. 9) has suggested that pilots would require such predictors in order to
interpret CDTI displays accurately.
METHODS
This investigation was designed as a part-task experiment using a three-factor
central composite design (ref. i0). The factors used were intruder horizontal miss
distance, intruder speed, and intruder initial starting altitude. The central com-
posite design was repeated for two different map ranges and thus each of the factors
was crossed with map range. This design allows the combination of a number of inde-
pendent variables, resulting in many distinct traffic scenarios. Such an experiment
would be prohibitively expensive and time consuming to use in more realistic simula-
tions with fully crossed designs. However, the design precludes analysis of more than
first order interactions. Since the higher order interactions are usually smaller and
difficult to interpret, this limitation was considered acceptable by the
investigators.
Subjects and General Procedure
Ten line-qualified commercial airline pilots whose flying time ranged from
5000 to 25,000 hours were tested. There were three captains, six first officers, and
one second officer who had previously served as a first officer. The experiment con-
sisted of 96 separate part-task scenarios of CDTI air traffic simulations presented
with an Evans and Sutherland calligraphic picture system (Type PS I). The experiment
was controlled by a PDP 11/40 computer running a program called INTRUD which gener-
ated the display and the traffic pattern, and recorded the pilots' responses
(ref. ii). Pilots responded on the Evans and Sutherland console, which was placed on
a table in front of the display. The ten pilots took from 1.0 to 3.0 hours each to
complete all 96 scenarios. The average time was 2.2 hours. A short debriefing after
each experimental run consisted of a question and answer session. The pilots took a
lO-minute break after each hour of experimentation.
Definitions of Dependent Variables
During each traffic scenario, pilots could respond by indicating an intention to
°o call the air traffic controller (ATC) or by selecting an avoidance maneuver or both.
The time of these responses was measured with respect to the time before the pre-
determined minimum separation between the conflicting aircraft. The time of calling
ATC was intended to measure pilot sensitivity to a situation unusual enough to require
more information from ATC. The time to maneuver was interpreted as the time at which
the pilot could no longer tolerate conditions without maneuvering his own ship
(OWNSHIP). The pilot had to identify which of the aircraft caused his "ATC call" or
maneuver by a workbook entry following each encounter. Each scenario stopped at the
time the pilot selected a maneuver or ended after 2 minutes if he chose not to
maneuver. The pilot's maneuver options were (i) no maneuver, (2) right turn only,
(3) right turn and climb, (4) right turn and descend, (5) climb only, (6) descend
only, (7) left turn only, (8) left turn and climb, and (9) left turn and descend.
The ten pilots rated their perceived level of collision danger to OWNSHIP for the
preceding scenario when each scenario ceased and the display froze as it had last
appeared. The variable, collision danger, ranged across seven levels (i through 7).
Threat levels i, 4, and 7, respectively, were anchored for the pilot by the defini-
tions: no danger, standard spacing violation, and imminent near miss or collision.
The pilot assigned one of these numbers to each simulated encounter.
Fixed Display Conditions
In addition to the intruding aircraft described below, each scenario featured
two other aircraft. One was an air transport, initially situated at about the
i0 o'clock position on the display, which always circled in a holding pattern with a
data tag indicating an altitude of approximately 3048 m (i0,000 ft) MSL. This cir-
cling transport was displayed with minor random perturbations of its speed and turn
rate. It was the only aircraft turning in any of the scenarios. A second background
aircraft had headings and speed distributions similar to the aircraft designated as
intruder but randomly chosen for each scenario. However, this "pseudo-intruder" was
always indicated to be at 2743 m (9000 ft) MSL with a horizontal miss distance with
respect to OWNSHIP of 6.4 km (3.5 n. mi.). The presence of the "pseudo-intruder"
forced the subject to discriminate the true intruder from two similar and potentially
threatening aircraft moving toward OWNSHIP on different headings.
The display map formed a 20.3-cm (8-in.) square at a distance of 63.5 cm (25 in.)
from the subjects and subtended a visual angle of approximately 18° (see fig. i). The
characters and symbols ranged in visual angle from 0.5 ° to 0.75 ° (5.5 to 8.2 mm),
except for the OWNSHIP symbol, which subtended 1.75 ° (1.92 cm) along its longest
dimension. Since we wished to be sure that accurate encounter information was avail-
able to the pilot, the display size was somewhat larger than that which actually
might be used in a cockpit. The focus of the experiment was on the pilots' decision
processes rather than on problems that might be introduced by the more limited reso-
lution and potential clutter on a smaller display.
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Figure I.- Representative traffic scenario: The banner at the top indicates the cur-
rently tuned VOR, the DME distance to this station, the course from the station,
and the distance in nautical miles from OWNSHIP to the top of the map, i.e., the
map range. OWNSHIP is at an angle of 70° with respect to the 008 radial from the
Denver VOR. The dashed lines indicate a band ±3 n. mi. along the current course.
The predictors on all aircraft extrapolate current velocity for 60 sec. The
history dots show 40 sec of:previous positions with each dot corresponding to a
4-sec update.
As can be seen in figure I, OWNSHIP was centered on the plan-view track-up dis-
play two thirds of the distance down from the top of the map. Intruding aircraft posi-
tions were updated every 4 sec, All aircraft traveled on the heading pointed to by
their symbol. The course prior to vectoring, the runways, and the VOR were perceived
to move continuously beneath OWNSHIP because of its higher update rate (five to six
times per second) and small displacement at each update. The data tag for each air-
craft listed: [first line] aircraft identification; and [second line] speed in knots
IAS, direction of vertical movement (i up, - level, + down) and altitude in hundreds
of feet (MSL). The apex of each symbol indicated current position of the aircraft. .
The end of the solid line leading in the direction of flight indicated the predicted
position in 60 sec. The dotted line trailing each symbol indicated a 40-sec history
of previous ground-referenced position. OWNSHIP was a chevron and all other aircraft
were triangles. The top of the map showed the name of the currently tuned VOR; the
range from that VOR (DME in n. mi.); the course heading (CRS); and the map range (MR).
The map range corresponded to the distance from the OWNSHIP position to the top of the
map. Each scenario was sequentially numbered at the upper right corner of the
display.
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Fixed Encounter Parameters
OWNSHIP, the intruder, and the pseudo-intruder flew straight trajectories
throughout all scenarios. In all scenarios OWNSHIP was flying straight and level at
230 knots IAS and at an altitude of 2286 m (7500 ft) MSL (712 m (2167 ft) AGL) above
the Denver Stapleton airport.
Variable Encounter Parameters and Display Conditions
Previous studies have shown that pilots have difficulty in determining whether
an intruder will pass in front of or behind their OWNSHIP (ref. 8) and, somewhat
surprisingly, that miss distances ranging from i n. mi. in front to I n. mi. behind
OWNSHIP did not influence perceived collision danger (ref. 5). Accordingly, only
forward miss distances over a much larger range were selected for this experiment.
This choice enhanced the possibility of detecting an effect of miss distance and
reduced the problem of mixed response strategies based on where the intruder is per-
ceived to cross the OWNSHIP trajectory. The planned levels of the independent varia-
bles concerning the intruding aircraft were determined by the central composite
design. They were, respectively, intruder horizontal miss distance at the end of
each sceanrio: 0.0, 1.0, 2.5, 4.0, and 5.0 km (0.0, 0.6, 1.5, 2.4, and 3.0 n. mi.),
always forward of OWNSHIP. Intruder speeds were 130.0, 171.5, 230.0, 289.5, or
330.0 knots IAS, and intruder starting altitude relative to OWNSHIP altitude was
-610 m (-2000 ft), -363 m (-1190 ft), 0 m, +363 m (1190 ft), or +610 m (2000 ft).
The levels of each variable occurred in a 1:4:6:4:1 ratio such that the third or
middle level was used most frequently. Intruder headings relative to OWNSHIP
(_157.5 °' _112.5 °, -67.5 °, -22.5 °, +22.5 °, +67.5 °, +112.5 °, or +157.5°; see fig. 2)
were each presented an equa ! number of times and were randomized across the factors
of the central composite design. The vertical miss distance of the intruders at the
end of each scenario were similarly randomly varied across three levels; 152 m
(500 ft) below OWNSHIP, at OWNSHIP's altitude, and 152 m (500 ft) above OWNSHIP. I
The vertical speeds varied from 381 m/min (1250 ft/min) to -381 m/min (-1250 ft/min).
This procedure generated 48 different encounter geometries, which were presented to
the pilot with either a 18.5-km (lO-n. mi.) or a 37-km (20-n. mi.) map range for a
total of 96 encounters.
Experimental Procedure
Each pilot initially read a briefing booklet describing the research, the flight
scenario, and the display format and symbology (see appendix A). The pilot was to
consider himself commander of OWNSHIP, a medium-sized transport (727 or 737) enroute
from Denver to Chicago. Having just taken off, he was to envisage being temporarily
vectored off his outbound course (Denver 008 radial) because of thunderstorms. He
was equipped with on-board CDTI showing true conditions unaffected by sensor noise or
tracker lag. Other aircraft on the display were to be considered as having neither a
CDTI nor a collision avoidance system. He was to assume that he was flying on auto-
matic pilot and was to make ATC calls and maneuvers as he would during a normal
departure from the Denver Stapleton airport. All calls to ATC and maneuvers would be
assumed to be only in response to threat to OWNSHIP.
IThe vertical speed of each intruder was fixed by its relative starting altitude
and its relative ending altitude (vertical miss distance). The time to minimum ver-
tical separation for the scenarios varied since some intruders would start above (or
below) OWNSHIP and fly to a point below (or above) OWNSHIP at 120 sec.
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Figure 2.- Intruder headings relative to ownship: Diagram of the eight heading dif-
ferences used in the experiment. Intruders would approach OWNSHIP from one of
these orientations during each scenario. Pilot maneuvers to the left would be con-
sidered toward intruders with positive headings and away from intruders with nega-
tive headings.
After terminating each scenario, the pilot wrote down the tag number of the air-
craft causing him to maneuver and his perception of the collision danger level of the
scenario. Maneuvers were selected by pilot activation of discrete console switches.
Use of a maneuver switch signaled the time the pilot would have maneuvered and the
type of maneuver he chose, and terminated the trial by freezing the display in order
to allow him to identify the aircraft causing his response.
Each pilot familiarized himself with the procedure and display during 16 practice
scenarios which took about 20 min to complete. The experiment did not begin until all
the pilot's procedural questions were answered and his performance on the practice
scenarios demonstrated his understanding of the responses he was expected to make.
When uninterrupted by a pilot-selected maneuver, the scenarios required 120 sec
to run to completion at which time the intruding aircraft would reach the predeter-
mined horizontal miss distance. The sequence of scenario presentation was changed
for each of the ten pilots to control for possible pilot fatigue or trends in pilot
responses. Since the pilot could reduce the time spent on each scenario by maneuver-
ing early, he had some control over the total duration of the experiment. We could
thus check for evidence of boredom by examining each pilot's decision latencies as the
experiment progressed. We found no evidence of pilots attempting to reduce the dura-
tion of the experiment. 2
Definition of Maneuver Categories
For some analyses all climbing maneuvers ("climb," "climb right," and "climb
left") were collapsed together. Similarly, all descending maneuvers were collapsed.
All maneuvers except "climb only" and "descend only" were considered when calculating
whether a response was turning toward or turning away from the intruder. A turn of
OWNSHIP in the current direction of the intruder constituted "turning toward" and
likewise turning OWNSHIP away from the intruder constituted "turning away" (see
fig. 2). This coding assumed that the intruder's position was on the same side of
OWNSHIP throughout the scenario and was determined by its heading difference as indi-
cated in figure 2.
RESULTS
The ten pilots made 782 maneuvers in a total of 958 scenarios. In 930 of the
958 scenarios, pilots identified a threatening aircraft. In the 28 scenarios in which
a threatening aircraft was not identified, there was only one scenario in which a
maneuver was selected; no collision danger was reported for this encounter. The
average collision danger for each of the remaining 27 scenarios, in which no maneuver
was selected, was very low (1.04).
The following experimental results fall into two distinct categories. The first
section describes the rather idiosyncratic effects of the independent variables on
the major dependent variables. The following sections describe the highly reliable
- patterns of avoidance maneuvers selected by the pilots.
Multiple Regression
Multiple regressions of ATC call time, maneuver time, and subjective threat
rating on five independent variables (horizontal miss distance, relative starting
ZFor each pilot the regression of maneuver time on the sequence number of
scenarios was computed. If there was a trend indicating boredom, for example, there
could have been longer maneuver times for early scenarios and shorter maneuver times
for later scenarios as the pilots attempted to shorten the experiment. No such
trends were found.
altitude, speed, map range, and vertical miss distance) were computed separately for
each pilot (ref. i0) (see table I). The regression equations included terms for all
possible linear, quadratic, and cubic main effects, and all possible first order
interactions. 3 The multiple Rs ranging from 0.55 to 0.87, though statistically
significant at the p < 0.01 level for almost all regressions, were not particularly
large (see appendix B for table of regression coefficients).
TABLE I.- REGRESSION EQUATIONS
.  xx+er o[i] Maneuver time = A + aixi + bix + cixi i i 3i= 5 i= _ i= 3 i=1,sj=1,sa
2] ATC call time = " " " ,, ,,
~
3] Collisiondanger = " " " ,, ,,
(i),b(i),c(i),d(i)= regressioncoefficients
x(i),y(i) = independent variables
A = intercept
error = error with mean equal to zero
Subscript identities
i Independent variable
i Intruder speed
2 Intruder horizontal miss distance
3 Intruder relative starting altitude
4 Intruder vertical miss distance
5 Map range
aThe interaction between intruder starting altitude and verti-
cal miss distance was not included because they were correlated
in the scenarios.
There was little commonality among the pilots' statistically reliable regression
coefficients. The full regression equations provided as tables in the appendix pre-
sent the multiple Rs, standard errors, and regression coefficients for all the
regressions calculated for each subject. Not more than five pilots ever had statisti-
cally reliable, p < 0.05, coefficients for any of the same terms in any of the regres-
tions. The main effect with the most intersubject agreement was that of horizontal
miss distance on collision danger. For four pilots it did show a tendency for closer
encounters to be associated with increased collision danger. The interaction with the
most intersubject agreement was the joint effect of intruder speed and the display map
range on the time five subjects chose to make ATC calls. This interaction reflects
that fact that for any given time to minimum separation slower aircraft a_e closer to
OWNSHIP. Thus, a difference in map range can determine when aircraft of different
speeds appear on the display (see appendix B).
In general, the regressions on the independent variables used to create the
various scenarios illustrate a pattern of statistically reliable effects that differs
3Regressions were also run without the quadratic and cubic terms, but no sub-
stantially different results were found.
substantially from pilot to pilot. This individual variation underscores" the poten-
tial for misinterpretation if all the pilots were averaged together. In view of
these clear individual differences, we have adopted the analytic philosophy that the
data should be analyzed on a subject-by-subject basis. We present results from
analyses on the pooled data only if we can also verify them on a subject-by-subject
basis.
Since perceived collision danger was a focus of this experiment, an alternative
regression analysis was attempted using step-wise regression in order to focus on the
effect of the systematically varied independent variables on it, particularly the
effect of minimum horizontal separation and map range. In addition to the partial
correlation coefficients, this technique provided information about the relative
importance of the regression terms by the order in which they were entered into the
- equation. The regression results from both conventional regression and the step-wise
regression could provide a basis for segregating pilots into groups with different
strategies for evaluating collision threat. In general, however, consistent subgroup-
ing based on the systematic independent variables did not emerge (see the appendix).
Histograms
Since another focus of the experiment was the potential effect of different map
ranges; frequency distributions of maneuver time and ATC call time were created
separately for each of the two map ranges (see figs. 3(a) and 3(b)). Figure 3(a)
shows a characteristic difference in the distribution of ATC call times between the
two map ranges which was observed for all the pilots -- that is that ATC calls were
made earlier with the 37-km (20-n. mi.) map range than with the 18.5-km (10-n. mi.)
map range.
Unlike the effect of map range on ATC call time, the differences between the
histograms of maneuver times, which appear as an early peak in the 37-km (20-n. mi.)
map histogram of figure 3(b), were attributable to only three pilots. These pilots
apparently maneuvered as soon as they could identify the intruder. For these three
pilots, maneuvers were made earlier with the 37-km map range than with the 18.5-km
map range. If the data from these three are removed, as in figure 3(b), the differ-
ence between the distributions of maneuver times for the two map ranges is greatly
reduced. The time of other pilots' maneuver selections varied substantially. One
pilot almost always maneuvered during the last minute before the end of the encounter.
Others maneuvered at intermediate times, but no pilot showed a pattern that could be
interpreted as attempting to maneuver whenever an intruder got within a fixed dis-
tance on the face of the display.
We further examined the possibility of the pilots' use of a separation criterion
in terms of inches on the display rather than miles on the map by calculating the
percent of maneuvers made by each subject with times to minimum separation ranges of
30 sec or less. Thirty seconds to minimum separation was chosen because that is the
time after which one might reasonably expect automatic collision avoidance alarms to
trigger. Across both map ranges, about 14% of all maneuvers fell into this category.
Over all pilots, there was a suggestion that more maneuvers were made with time to
minimum separation of less than 30 sec when the pilots used the 18.5-km map range:
17% of all maneuvers made with the 18.5-km map were in this range compared to 10%
made with the 37-km map. However, only five subjects showed a higher percentage of
maneuvers 30 sec or less before minimum separation for the 18.5-km as compared to the
37-km map. Thus the tendency to allow intruders to come temporally closer before
maneuvering when using the 18.5-km map range was not general. Similarly, only 6.5%
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z Figure 3(a).- Histograms of ATC call time by map range: The total frequency of all pilots' calls to ATC con-
cerning potential traffic problems is plotted as a decreasing function of time before minimum separation.
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Figure 3(b).- Histograms of maneuver time by map range: The total frequency of all
pilots' selection of traffic avoidance maneuvers is plotted as a decreasing func-
tion of time before minimum separation. The solid line shows the effect upon the
distribution if the three "early decision" pilots are removed from the analysis.
of all the maneuvers made less than 30 sec before the end of the encounter involved
encounters with minimum separations less than 1.5 n. mi. Thus, the effect of map
range on time of maneuver decision appears to be limited to encounters with the larger
miss distances. Accordingly, subject-by-subject distributions of maneuver times
confirmed the regression results showing no general or consistent variation over the
group of ten pilots attributable to map range.
PILOT MANEUVER TENDENCIES
Figure 4 shows the distribution of all eight pilot maneuvers and includes the
category of level flight and no turn, i.e., no response.
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Figure 4.- Distribution of chosen maneuvers: Nine cell figure with mean percentage
and standard error of all nine maneuver options. The distribution of the mean
percentages shows a predominance of the horizontal maneuvers, a slight tendency to
turn toward the intruding aircraft, and a slight preference for climbing over
descending vertical maneuvers.
The decisions to turn or climb appeared independent of each other as shown by a
statistically powerful x-square test on a table of total numbers of maneuvers in
each category used in figure 4 (x-square = 8.74, df = 4, p > 0.05). Inspection of
this figure shows that the middle row of purely horizontal maneuvers or no maneuvers
is substantially larger than the top or bottom rows. This tendency was examined
pilot by pilot by collapsing maneuver selections into three categories, purely verti-
cal, purely horizontal, and mixed, in order to create table 2 (the no-maneuver option
was not included).
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TABLE 2.- DISTRIBUTION OF HORIZONTAL,VERTICAL,AND MIXED MANEUVERS
Pilot I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 i0 Totals Mean(SE)
Horizontal only 80 24 58 15 27 65 38 79 91 76 544 54.0(8.38)
Vertical only 0 0 0 22 6 0 9 5 2 2 46 4.6(2.16)
Mixed 1 63 23 23 27 5 17 12 3 18 192 19.2(5.63)
Chl-square 93.1 25.4 43.1 2.2 7.4 67.3 15.5 53.7 97.3 59.3
a a b G a a a a
df = 2
ap < 0.005
b p < 0.01
If pilots ignored the display and made purely random selections of the eight
maneuvers, one would expect a relative proportion of 1:1:2 across the three response
categories: horizontal, vertical, and mixed. Nine of the ten pilots diverged from
the null hypothesis and showed a strong preference for pure horizontal as opposed to
vertical maneuvers (two-tailed sign test, p < 0.015). In contrast, none of the pilots
showed a reliable left/right bias in his choice of horizontal maneuver.
In order to further examine the pilots' choice of horizontal maneuvers, the dis-
tribution of eight maneuvers shown in figure 4 was collapsed into two cells for each
pilot: all turns toward and all turns away from the intruder (see table 3). Six of
the ten pilots had an overall tendency to turn toward the intruder more frequently
than away. However, chi-square tests of the hypothesis that turns toward and away
occur with equal frequency show this Bias to be reliable for only four subjects. An
analysis of maneuvers in the last 30 sec before an encounter shows a stronger bias but
TABLE 3.- TURNS TOWARD AND AWAY FROM INTRUDERS (OVERALL)
Overall
Toward 52 48 66 16 49 64 33 54 46 38 466
Away 29 39 15 22 5 4 22 28 48 56 268
1.5 32.9 I.II 4_23 0.0 1.74Chi-square 3.83 0.47 I_.8 0.48 2 a a
Less than 30 sec to encounter
,.
Toward 19 15 II 0 28 3 13 0 0 I 90
- Away 5 6 2 0 i 2 0 i 0 0 I 16
Chi-square 4_46 2.02 4_14 -- 13d9 -- 4_37 ......
df = i
a
p < 0.005
b
p < 0.05
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still is not reliable across Pilots (see totals in table 3). However, if the distri-
bution of maneuvers was collapsed across all encounters and all pilots, turns toward
the intruder occurred twice as oftenas turns away.
Horizontal Maneuvers and Subjective Threat
Another perspective on the difference between the pilots' decision to turn toward
or away from an intruder is provided by the perceived collision danger associated with
the pilots' maneuver decisions. For each pilot the average judged collision danger
was computed for all turns toward and all turns away from the intruder (table 4).
For nine out of ten pilots the average collision danger was judged greater for
scenarios in which they turned away than for those in which they turned toward (two-
tailed sign test, p < 0.015).
TABLE 4.- AVERAGE COLLISION DANGER FOR TOWARD AND AWAY
MANEUVERS BY PILOT
Pilot I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 i0
Maneuver:
Toward 3.15 4.75 5.35 4.81 3.90 5.33 4.79 2.46 5.33 5.50
Away 4.83 5.41 6.07 5.18 4.00 7.00 5.09 3.14 5.58 5.29
Further analysis of the relationship between collision danger andthe tendency
to turn toward the intruder showsthat the level of judged collision danger modulated
the percent of turning-toward maneuvers. For each pilot the percent of turning-
toward maneuvers was determined for the subsets of encounters with differing levels
of judged collision danger. Linear regressions were then determined for each subject
with percent turning-t0ward maneuvers as the dependent variable. The slopes of all
regressions were negative, indicating that increases in the danger of thescenario
resultedin a decreased likelihood that the evasive maneuver would involve turning
toward the intruder (see table 5). This result is summarized in figure 5, which
shows that increases in the perceived collision danger of traffic encounters generally
decreases the pilot bias to turn toward the intruding aircraft. For low collision
dangers (from 1 to 3) pilots preferred to turn toward the intruder 4.3 times as fre-
quently as to turn away.
TABLE 5.- REGRESSIONS OF PERCENT TOWARDS MANEUVERS ON COLLISION DANGER
Pilot i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 "9 I0
Slope -9.28 -19.4 -9.46 -13.8 -0.41 -5.00 -4.10 -14.6 -15.5 -8.10
Constant 103.3 154.8 133.6 124.8 94.7 120.0 84.6 107.9 121.2 86.2
Correlation -.72 -.97 -.91 -.77 -.08 -.71_ -.54 -.96 -.81 -.64
(Two-tailed sign text, p < 0.0032)
14
1.0
I I I I I I I
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
COLLISION DANGER
Figure 5.- Turning toward intruder vs collision danger: Turning-toward maneuvers of
ten pilots at each of seven levels of relative danger. Percent values (±I stan-
dard error) averaged across each pilot. A simple linear regression on the averaged
fraction of horizontal maneuvers that were toward the intruder resulted in:
Y = -9.393X + 109.286 and is plotted on the figure.
Evasive Maneuvers and Encounter Geometry
Heading difference of intruding aircraft- The heading difference of the intrud-
ing aircraft relative to OWNSHIP _ also modulated the pilots' threat perception and
their decisions to turn toward or away from the intruder. The mean perceived level
of threat for each intruder heading was determined across subjects. Subject-by-
subject regressions were then determined to illustrate the effect of the absolute
value of heading difference on mean collision danger (see table 6). All of these
regressions have negative slopes, indicating that for intruders approaching more and
more frontally, i.e., larger absolute values of heading difference, pilots perceived
scenarios as presenting less danger of collision.
Probably reflecting the difference in perceived threat, intruderscoming from
positions in front of the pilot's OWNSHIP were more frequently avoided by turns
4This heading difference would be zero if both OWNSHIP and the intruder were
flying the same heading and would be 180 ° if they flew exactly opposite headings.
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TABLE 6.- REGRESSIONS OF MEANCOLLISION DANGER ON ABSOLUTE VALUE OF HEADING DIFFERENCE
Pilot I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 I0
Slope -0.012 -0.001 -0.007 -0.016 -0.006 -0.007 -0.010 -0.006 -0.004 -0.009
Constant 4.433 5.003 5.784 5.205 3.378 5.450 4.803 3.134 5.771 6.496
Correlation -.910 -.159 -.798 -.922 -.604 -.876 -.843 -.643 -.862 _.977
(Two-tailed sign test on regression slopes, p < 0.0032)
toward thanwhen they approachedlaterallyor from behind (see fig. 2). Accordingly,
regressionsof percentmaneuverstoward the intruderon the absolutevalue of heading
differencewere computed for each pilot (seetable 7). All ten pilotshad positive
regressions,indicatingthat increasesin the absolutevalue of headingdifference
resultedin more maneuverstoward the intruder. The table confirmsthe across-
subjectresultsin figure 6 in which the averageresponsesfor the ten pilots show a
regularincreasein the percentof turns toward the intruderas the absolutevalue of
heading differenceincreases.
TABLE 7.- REGRESSIONS OF PERCENT TOWARD MANEUVERS ON ABSOLUTE VALUE OF
HEADING DIFFERENCE
Pilot 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 I0
Slope 0.005 0.006 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.007
Constant .227 ,019 .561 .066 .806 .822 .291 .326 .039 .183
Correlation .97 .89 .89 .96 .81 .77 .94 .91 .89 .91
(Two-tailed sign test of the sign of these regression slopes, p < 0.0032)
Starting Altitude of Intruding Aircraft
An attempt was made to analyze bias in the choice of vertical maneuvers as was
done for horizontal maneuvers. The intruder's starting altitude took five values:
-2000, -1190, O, 1190, and 2000 ft relative to OWNSHIP. For each of these altitudes,
the intruder flew to a vertical miss distance of -500, O, or 500 ft relative to
OWNSHIP. Table 8 lists climbing and descending maneuvers for all ten pilots as a
function of whether the intruder started below, above, or at OWNSHIP's altitude.
These data pooled across allpilots suggest that pilots tend to maneuver away
from intruders at different initial altitudes; intruders starting below OWNSHIP cause
climbs and intruders starting above OWNSHIP cause descents. This tendency was
further examined by computing the percent climbs of all vertical maneuvers for each
of the intruder starting altitudes. In table 9 the regressions of percent of climbing
evasive maneuvers on intruder starting altitude are presented. The predominance of
negative slopes of the regressions shows that increases in the relative starting
altitude of the intruder causes a decreased likelihood of climbing.
In figure 7 the results averaged across pilots confirm that pilots tended to
climb to evade intruders starting below them. However, this averaged response does
not support a conclusion that intruders starting above cause descending evasive
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Figure 6.- Turning toward intruder vs intruder heading difference: The fraction of
horizontal maneuvers toward the intruder were averaged across each pilot for each
heading difference to calculate mean fractions and standard errors. Since no
difference was found between positive and negative intruder headings, the absolute
value of the heading difference was used. The simple linear regression through
the average values is: Y = 0.408X + 29.34 and is plotted.
TABLE 8.- CLI_ING AND DESCENDING MANEUVERS OF ALL
PILOTS ACCORDING TO STARTING ALTITUDE OF INTRUDER _
Below Same altitude Above
Total
-2000/-1190 0 1190/2000
Climb 67 53 15 135
Descend 5 50 48 103
Total 72 103 63 238
(Chi-square = 67.683, degrees of freedom = 2;
p < 0.001)
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TABLE 9.- REGRESSIONS OF PERCENT OF CLIMBING MANEUVERS ON INTRUDER
STARTING ALTITUDE
Pilot Ia 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9a I0
Slope -- -0.037 -0.032 -0.017 -0.012 -0.042 0.000 -0.010 -- -0.030
Constant -- 37.56 27.29 41.44 69.00 50.00 95.4 66.03 -- 58.17
Correlation -- -.92 -.61 -.70 -.96 -I.00 0.00 -.66 -- -.85
(Two-tailed sign test of the sign of the regression slopes, p < 0.0156)
CTwo pilots [i and 9] performed cllmb/descent maneuvers with the intruder at only one "
relative starting altitude and thus had to be excluded from this analysis.
J
Figure 7.- Pilot vertical maneuvers vs intruder starting altitude: The fraction of
all maneuvers that included a climbing component was averaged across all pilots
and plotted for each of the five relative starting altitudes of the intruding air-
craft. Each average is bounded by ±i standard error. Since some pilots selected
no vertical maneuvers when confronted with intruders from a particular starting
altitude, the number of values used from each standard error varied. The number
of pilots that contributed a value to each of the averages displayed are 7, 8, I0,
7, and 4 for -2000, -1190, 0, 1190, and 2000 ft starting altitude, respectively.
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maneuvers. The mean percent climbing response is essentially the same at starting
altitudes of O, 1190, and 2000 ft. s
Since there were relatively few maneuvers selected with a vertical component,
there were insufficient data to examine the possibility that either perceived threat
or heading difference influenced choice of vertical maneuver.
DISCUSSION
The results of this experiment at first seem paradoxical. The major independent
variables did not influence the timing of simulated ATC calls, pilot maneuver selec-
. tions, or pilot perceived collision threat in uniform ways across all pilots. The
pattern of the pilots' actual maneuver selections, however, exhibited substantial
regularities across all subjects. Our general inference from this contrast is that
the pilots in this experiment adopted decision strategies sensitive to subjective
aspects of the encounters (perceived threat or perceived miss distance), which varied
from pilot to pilot.
Multiple Regressions and Histograms
Since thethree central composite design factors, horizontal miss distance,
intruder speed, and initial intruder altitude, did not affect the timing of the
pilots' avoidance behavior or their perception of collision danger in consistent ways,
these factors principally served as a means of systematically generating a variety of
encounters with which to examine the effect of the map ranges, 18.5 km and 37 km.
Similarly, the random variation of the heading difference and vertical miss distance
aided this comparison by introducing added elements of uncertainty, thus maintaining
pilot interest by ensuring that the different scenarios appeared distinct, novel, and
unrelated to each other•
Importantly, the failure to identify reliable effects of the independent varia-
bles on timing or perceived collision danger should not be a basis for deciding that
they do not generally influence pilot behavior. The range of the variables used may
simply have been too small to have been perceived by the pilots under the specific
experimental conditions Minimum miss distance, for example, provided a hint of an• 6
effect and might show a stronger effect if it were varied over a larger range. Thus,
the differing patterns of pilots' response timing and threat perception may reflect
genuine variation in the pilots' sensitivities to the parameters defining the traffic
conflicts.
sPilots selected vertical maneuvers to avoid intruders originating from various
- starting altitudes. Thus, the number of pilots used in computing each mean in
figure 7 varies because some pilots selected no vertical maneuvers for intruders
originating at a particular starting altitude. In figure 7 the large standard errors
of the response to intruders starting above may in part be due to the small number of
pilots selecting vertical maneuvers for intruders starting from +1190 and +2000 ft.
6Palmer (ref. 9) has argued, however, that pilots have difficulty detecting
whether an intruder will pass in front or behind OWNSHIP: The miss distance might
have to be considerably increased before a reliable effect on the timing of ATC
cells or maneuvers is detected.
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Despite statistically powerful tests, we have no systematic evidence that the
pilot responses were affected by the map scale of the displayed information. Rather,
the pilots seem to have genuinely interpreted the symbolic information shown in terms
of the actual traffic encounter. The most direct evidence for this conclusion comes
from the failure of map range to show consistently statistically reliable effects on
the three major dependent variables, ATC call time, maneuver time, or judged colli-
sion danger. The analyses of the overall distributions of ATC and maneuver times
generally support this conclusion. The pilots' appropriate rescaling of their inter-
pretation of the display is probably due to "yardsticks" that were provided by the
60-sec predictors which previous experiments show to be the part of the intruder
symbol most often viewed (refs. 12 and 13).
The difference that was noticed between the 18.5-km and 37-km ATC call time
histograms undoubtedly results from the fact that on any particular encounter it is
necessary to wait longer to see the intruder on the display with the smaller map
range. Interestingly, this reliable effect of map range on ATC call time is not
evident in the regression analysis. The large within-subject variation in ATC call
time itself obscures this difference.
The contrast between the distributions of maneuver time is a better test of the
symbolic interpretation of the display since the intruding aircraft was visible on
both the 18.5-km and 37-km map range during the period when maneuvers were made.
Aside from the three "early-decision" pilots, the individual distributions of
maneuver time were not affected by changes in map scale.
The maneuver time histograms provide data of potential importance for the inter-
action of CDTI and collision avoidance systems. Most of the maneuvers, about 86%,
occurred before 30 sec to minimum miss distance, a time well before most collision
avoidance systems would issue a positive avoidance command. Only the approximately
14% of all maneuvers which were made within 30 sec of an encounter are in potential
conflict with collision avoidance alarms. Interestingly, about 86% of the maneuvers
within 30 sec of an encounter were turns toward the intruder. This percentage is
higher than the overall percentage, which was about 60% turning toward. This increase
in the tendency to turn toward for the late maneuvers may be explained by the tendency
of the pilots to maneuver earlier for the encounters judged more threatening. Thus,
the late maneuvers are primarily executed for lower threat encounters and, as in the
case with lower threat encounters in general, show a stronger turnlng-toward tendency.
Indeed, almost all (93.5%) of the late maneuvers occurred with predetermined
miss distances of 1.5 n. mi. or more. The close encounters, collisions, and near
misses almost always prompted maneuvers earlier than 30 sec to minimum separation.
Another aspect of the maneuvering before reaching minimum separation is that the
extensive maneuvering within 60 sec of minimum separation could introduce uncertainty
and complicate the task of the automatic collision avoidance algorithms. Alterna-
tively, the pilot maneuvering might bypass the collision avoidance alarms by prevent-
ing sufficiently close encounters from occurring. The development of a model summar-
izing pilot maneuver bias while using CDTI might help determine how often the pilot
maneuvers early and bypasses the CAS alarms.
Maneuver Distributions
Horizontal and vertical maneuvers- In view of the substantial variation in pilot
decision timing and threat evaluation, the amount of intersubject agreement in
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maneuver selection is striking. The pilots demonstrated significantly more purely
horizontal maneuvers than purely vertical maneuvers, as shown in table 2. This
predominance of horizontal maneuvers may be due to procedural influences such as the
relatively greater horizontal latitude allowed pilots under FAA regulations compared
to the greater restriction in vertical spacing, 7 concerns for passenger comfort and
safety, or fuel conservation. Alternatively, the better display of the horizontal
traffic situation may have biased the pilots to choose horizontal maneuvers.
Turning Toward Intruder and Collision Danger
The observation that the pilots' impression of collision threat was a strongly
modulating influence on their turning-toward tendency underscores the importance of
such subjective factors. These factors are particularly important since pilots often
have difficulty accurately perceiving whether an intruder will pass in front of or
behind their aircraft (ref. 9). Since maneuver decisions are apt to be based on
perceived separation, perceived time to minimum miss distance, and perceived heading
difference, we plan to quantitatively examine these subjective variables in future
experiments.
Since the turns toward the intruders temporarily decrease separation but more
quickly resolve the conflicts, pilots appeared willing to accept this momentary
decrease in separation in order to protect themselves from the future problems of an
unresolved encounter. Since pilots have mentioned that the turning-toward maneuver
potentially keeps the intruder in sight, their choices of maneuvers may also have
been motivated by previous VFR flight experience (ref. 5). Of course, using CDTI th_
intruder would always be in sight on the display, regardless of the geometrical
relationship of OWNSHIP and the intruder.
Heading Difference
Pilots tended to turn toward the intruder when the intruder was approaching
frontally (large heading difference), but this bias lessened when the approach was
more lateral or from behind (small heading difference). When turning toward an
intruder that is in front of OWNSHIP, a smaller, shorter-duration turn is required to
maneuver OWNSHIP so as to get behind the intruder. Also, when the absolute value of
heading difference is large, the horizontal separation between the intruder and
OWNSHIP is greater, allowing more space for the turning-toward maneuver. Conversely,
smaller absolute values of heading difference place the intruder closer to a course
parallel to that of OWNSHIP with less space for maneuver and the requirement for a
longer duration turn in order to get behind the intruder. Thus, when the heading
difference was small, a turn toward would require a long-duration maneuver. During
such a maneuver slight changes in the intruder's heading could put OWNSHIP at greater
risk. Accordingly, as they occasionally mentioned in their debriefing, pilots were
concerned that the intruder might maneuver and choose maneuvers to reduce future
possible conflicts by turning away.
Another influence on the maneuvers made to avoid aircraft may arise from the fact
that turns toward an aircraft which is going to pass in front of OWNSHIP with a head-
ing difference greater than 45 ° will increase ultimate minimum separation. However,
75.6-9.3 km (3-5 n. mi.) horizontal separation versus 305-m (lO00-ft) separations
between IFR aircraft and 152-m (500-ft) separation between IFR and VFR aircraft.
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if the intruder's heading difference is less than 45°, then turns toward it may
reduce minimum separation. This difference does not generalize to all turns and
critically depends upon the amount of heading change a turn produces. However, the
pilots' greater preference for turns toward intruders with large heading _ifferences
may result from their perception that turns toward such intruders can increase mini-
mum Separation.
Starting Altitude
The subjects demonstrated a significant tendency to climb away from intruders
starting below OWNSHIP (fig. 7). There is no corresponding evidence of a tendency of
pilots to descend below intruders starting above OWNSHIP. The explanation for a lack
of the descent tendency may be due to the fact that OWNSHIP is only 762 m (2167 ft)
above the ground, having just taken off from the Denver Stapleton airport. During
debriefing, five of the ten pilots mentioned that they were concerned about the prox-
imity of the ground during their maneuver decisions. The lack of a descent tendency
may also have been due to a preference for positive g maneuvers or due to the pilots
being on departure and therefore planning to gain altitude for their flight to
Chicago. The effect of the pseudo-intruder (always 457 m (1500 ft) above OWNSHIP)
should, if anything, bias pilot maneuvers toward descents.
In general we might expect the flight segment to affect vertical maneuver selec-
tion. If OWNSHIP were cruising at a higher altitude, we might expect to find a more
symmetrical response. Similarly, on arrival pilots might climb less and on departure
they might climb more (ref. 5).
The fact that pilots mainly used horizontal maneuvers may have been due to the
poor presentation of the vertical situation. The altitude of the intruder and direc-
tion of vertical movement were available only as data tags. Thus, the p±lot was pre-
sented with a relatively poor representation of vertical separation. Given this lack
of precise intruder vertical position information, pilots understandably avoided a
possible increase in risk associated with a vertical "turning-toward" maneuver.
Future experiments with analog displays of intruders' vertical position might demon-
strate different vertical maneuvering strategies.
Specific Findings
The following specific observations represent initial pilot behavior when using
CDTI without specific training or avoidance procedures. They summarize the statisti-
cally reliable results of the experiment. However, since the current experiment is
part of an ongoing series of related experiments, these results should not be
regarded as final conclusions regarding pilot avoidance behavior when using CDTI.
I. Pilots tended to select avoidance maneuvers at least 30 sec before the point
of minimum separation from an intruding aircraft.
2. Timing of maneuver selection was affected by time of appearance of the
intruding aircraft, but inches on the display were not confused with true separation
in nautical miles.
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3. Pilots most often selected horizontal maneuvers to resolve conflicts.
4. Pilots often avoidedpotentialconflictsby turningtoward intrudingair-
craft,but when they reportedgreatercollisiondanger this tendencylessened.
5. The greater the heading differences were between OWNSHIP and the intruder,
i.e., the more frontal the intruder's approach, the greater was the pilots' tendency
to turn toward them.
6. Pilots tended to climb away from intruders which appear initially below
OWNSHIP, but corresponding descents from intruders above OWNSHIP were less
frequent.
- GENERAL CONCLUSION
A general implication of the pilots' tendency to turn toward an intruder is that
two pilots, each equipped with CDTI displays, might both attempt to maneuver so as to
get behind each other, thus decreasing separation (ref. 8). A similar phenomenon has
been described in maritime navigation and is termed "radar assisted collision"
(ref. 7). As in the case of ship captains, pilots may require training with appro-
priate right of way rules and/or use of automatic systems to guarantee safe aircraft
separation.
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APPENDIX A
COCKPIT DISPLAY OF TRAFFIC INFORMATION
J. D. Smith and Steve Ellis
April 16, 1981
INTRODUCTION
This series of displays of air traffic conditions presents scenarios of various
levels of threat. The purpose of the experiment is to measure pilot response to any
perceived threat during these traffic conditions and the relative danger to his ship.
One goal of this experiment and related studies is to develop automatic logic systems
consistent with pilot threat perception.
Other aircraft displayed will vary in a number of objective dimensions such as
miss distance, turn rate, horizontal and vertical velocity and bearing relative to
OWNSHIP. OWNSHIP parameters, however, will remain the same throughout the experiment.
You will be flying six sets of sixteen traffic conditions. The experimental sequence
is divided into a familiarization/practice session; the experimental traffic condi-
tions and a debriefing.
SYMBOLOGIES
OWNSHIP:
_60 second flightpath predictor
40 second flightpath history
230-075
OWNSHIP TAG:
XXX-YY-ZZZ
XXX- Groundspeed, measured in knots
YY - Indication of vertical speed: up arrow, climbing; -, level flight;
down arrow, descending
ZZZ- Barometric Altitude, measured in hundreds of feet (i.e., 075 corresponds
to 7500 ft)
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INTRUDER:
_60 second flightpath predictor
__--_ 40 second flightpath predictor
UA 593
240 i00
" INTRUDER TAG:
UA NNN
XXX-YY-ZZZ
UA - Designates airline, i.e., United Airlines
NNN- Designates flight number
XXX- Groundspeed, measured in knots
YY - Indication of vertical speed: up arrow, climbing; -, level flight;
and down arrow, descending
ZZZ- Barometric altitude, measured in hundreds of feet (i.e., i00 corresponds
to i0,000 ft)
Note: Actual position of each aircraft is at the forward tip of the symbols that
represent them.
DISPLAY CONSOLE:
CRS MR •_ FTraffic Condition NumberrUN DM_
DE_ 4.0 125 2O
: : _ _ VOR = Denver
• : : I% DME = distance from Denver, 4 n. mi.• , 0 CRS = course, 125° radial out of• m
, , • Denver
• " _ MR = map range, 20 miles
"" ,.v9.
: • : Note: Map range is measured from the
• | ' | location of OWNSHIP, tip of chevron,
: I : _ to the top of the display
23i _iT__OWNSHIP location--,OWNSHIPTAG: 230 knots, level, 7500 ft
% A " I
Navigation points :
- - Way point
- VOR/DME
Note: This is a map up display where you are vectored off course. The course refer-
ence (CRS 008) refers to the center dotted line.
NOTE: Assume that your onboard CDTI (computer display of traffic information) will
at all times display to you true conditions unaffected by weather or radar tracker
noise.
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BASIC SCENARIO:
You are the commander of OWNSHIP, a medium transport such as a 727 or 737, out-
bound from Denver to Chicago on the eight degree radial to GILL. You have been tem-
porarily vectored off your course. Your onboard CDTI (computer display of traffic
information) will at all times portray to you true conditions unaffected by weather
or radar tracker noise. Other aircraft on your display have transponders but have
neither displays of traffic nor automatic collision avoidance systems.
SOME ADDITIONAL ASSUMPTIONS:
Assume IFR conditions (i.e., you can't visually see other aircraft).
Assume that you are flying with the autopilot.
TASK:
In all traffic conditions you are requested to monitor the display for one or
both of two contingencies. First, should you decide that a condition is comparable
to one where you would call the ATC regarding your situation, pull of the 'ATC call'
switch at the left of your console. Two, if the situation develops such that you
decide to maneuver in order to decrease the threat of collision, pull the switch
corresponding to your desired maneuver: (Note: only switches marked "X" are active.)
CONSOLE
X X 0 X 0 X O X O X O X O X O X
ATC left climb descent climb descend climb descend right
CALL left left right right
Pilot Maneuver (select one only)
Note: When you pull the "ATC Call" or a maneuver swltch, it assumed that these deci-
sions refer to a threat of collision by an intruder (which you designate by data tag)
with OWNSHIP. Should you decide to call ATC or maneuver for any other reason please
write down the reason in your workbook.
The CDTI display will freeze at the time you pull a maneuver switch. Should you
not choose to maneuver the display will automatically be stopped after 2 minutes.
For every traffic condition:
i. Write the number of aircraft of principal concern, and
2. Circle the relative danger to OWNSHIP as one of the seven danger levels below
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
no standard collision
danger spacing or near
violation miss with
relative to OWNSHIP
OWNSHIP imminent
Circle one of these levels for each traffic condition in your booklet.
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PRACTICE RUN:
In order to familiarize you with this CDTI and the experimental task you will
fly a practice series of traffic conditions. Enter your danger level rating and any
comments you have regarding each traffic condition.
DEBRIEFING:
A short discussion of the experimental traffic conditions will follow each set
of 16 scenarios. Discussion and rerunning of selected traffic conditions will
- follow completion of all six sets of conditions.
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APPENDIX B
The following tables list all the statistically significant regression coeffi-
cients found in regressions which were calculated to analyze the independent variables
of this experiment.
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TABLE BI.- REGRESSION WITH ATC CALL TIME AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Regression coefficients
Standard Linear effects Quadratic effects
Subject MultipleR errors of
regression Horizontal Intruder Vertical Map Horizontal Intruder Vertical
Speed miss starting miss Speed miss starting miss
distance altitude distance range distance altitude distance
1 0.631 a 18.7 ....... 0.03b ............... ---
2 .756a 13.7 ............ ......... 0.001 a ---
3 .772a 13.7 .......... 0.04c O.001a --- .001a ---
4 .789a 11.5 ............ 3.79a ............
5 .597a 13.8 ............ 3.54a ............
6 .664a _ 14.4 ...........................
7 .566 25.4 ...........................
8 ............................... Insufficient variance in data for analysis
9 .761a 11.3 ...........................
I0 .878a 11.4 ............ 7.96b .........
Cubic effects Interactions
Horizontal Horizontal
Speed Speed Speed Speed miss miss Horizontal Map Mapmiss range range Constant
Horizontal Intruder × x x distance distance
× distance x x of
Subject Speed miss starting horizontal intruder vertical x x
distance altitude miss starting miss map intruder vertical x intruder vertical regression
distance altitude distance range starting miss map starting miss
altitude distance range altitude distance
1 ..................................... 70.8
2 ........................... 0.001 c .... 119.1
3 ....... 0.001c ...... 0.001 b -0.015 a ---
4 D.OOl b -.001a .... .OIBa ............. 107.2
......................... 38 7
5 ................... .011a ................ 116.6
6 ............... .001e ................ 108.1
7 ....................................
8 .......... Insufficient variance for analysis
1 I......1 -9 ......... -.038 a ___ 0.008 c .......... 113.310 .001 c ............................ 144.4
b c
< 0.05 p < 0.025 p < 0.01
TABLE B2.- REGRESSION WITH MANEUVER TIME AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Regression coefficients
Standard Linear effects Quadratic effects
Subject Multiple
R errors of
regression Horizontal Intruder Vertical Horizontal Intruder Vertical
Speed miss starting miss Map Speed miss starting miss
distance altitude distance range distance altitude distance
1 0.577a 19.9 .................. 23.02 c ___ ___
2 .668a 16.3 ..................... 0.001 a ___
3 .745a 17.6 ..................... .001a ___
4 .798a 14.3 ............ 3.54 c .... 13.3b .001a ___
5 .658a 18.8 ...........................
6 .573 18.0 ...... 0.001 c ..................
7 .550 27.6 ...........................
8 .814a 10.4 ...........................
9 .765a 11.2 ...........................
I0 .699c 14.8 ...........................
Cubic effects Interactions
Horizontal Horizontal
Speed Speed Speed miss miss Horizontal Map Map
Horizontal Intruder × × × Speed miss range rangedistance distance Constant
Subject Speed miss starting horizontal intruder vertical x , x x distance x x of
distance altitude miss starting miss map intruder vertical x intruder vertical regression
distance altitude distance range starting miss map starting miss
altitude distance range altitude distance
1 .... 6.69c. -.............................. 59.3
2 --- "0010 ..................... --- 0.001a .... 36.4
3 ................... 0.02_ ............. 98.0
4 o.ooI 541 ............. .ol ...... iii ....... 111.3
5 ........................ _ ..............
6 ..................................... 68.8
7 ............ _ .....
8 ................... .01a 0"003c --- .......... 109.8
9 ................... .01_ --- 0.007c ....... .- -105.1
I0 ................... .010 ___ .01c .......... 115.0
< 0.05 bp < 0.025 Cp < 0.01
.._ TABLE B3.- REGRESSION WITH COLLISION DANGER AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Regression coefficients
Standard Linear effects Quadratic effects
Subject MultipleR errors of
Horizontal Intruder Vertical
regression Horizontal Intruder Vertical Map
Speed miss starting miss Speed miss starting miss
distance altitude distance range distance altitude distance
I 0.803 a 1.25 .... 3.3 a .....................
2 .805a .67 .... 2.1a ............ 0.06b ......
3 .654a 1.26 ...........................
4 .719a 1.64 ...........................
5 .702a 1.28 ...........................
6 .786a 1.18 ..... 1.8e ............
7 .588a 1.06 .... 1.6e .... 0.003 e 0.22e ......... 0.001 b
8 .613a 1.61 ...........................
9 .536 ..............................
10 .360 ..............................
Cubic effects Interactions
Horizontal Horizontal
Horizontal Map Map
Speed Speed Speed Speed miss miss miss range range
Horizontal Intruder x x x distance distance Constant
x! distance x x
Subject Speed miss starting horizontal intruder vertical x x x of
distance altitude miss starting miss map intruder vertical intruder vertical regression
distance altitude distance range starting miss map starting miss
altitude distance range altitude distance
I .................. 0.001 c ............ --- 10.8
2 .................................... 9.0
3 ............... 0.001 e .............. --- 8.7
4 ..................... --- 0.001 b ......... 6.6
5 ...... 0.001 a ........................... 5.9
_6 i .................................... 3.4
7 .................................... .9
8 .................................... 6.6
9 .......................................
10 .......................................
b c
< 0.05 p < 0.025 p < 0.01
Step-wise regressions were calculated using, in addition to the systematically
varied independent variables, some of the randomly changed variables such as heading
difference, the initial slant range between OWNSHIP and the intruder, initial hori-
zontal and vertical separation between OWNSHIP and the intruder, the length of the
intruder's predictor, and an encoding of whether the intruder intercepted OWNSHIP's
altitude during the encounter. These regressions confirm the importance of the head-
ing difference for determining perceived collision danger and suggest that horizontal
miss distance may also be a factor influencing perceived collision danger. Horizontal
miss distance probably should be varied over a greater range for it to show up as a
reliable predictor of collision danger under the display conditions we were using.
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TABLE B4.- STEP-WISE REGRESSION WITH COLLISION DANGER AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE COEFFICIENTS OF TEPMS KEPT
IN THE ANALYSIS
Linear effects
Absolute Intruder
Standard Horizontal Intruder Vertical Intruder
intruder intercepts
Subject Multiple errors of Speed miss starting miss Map heading heading OWNSHIP
R regression distance altitude distance range difference difference altitude
1 0.813 a 1.12 0.005 s* -3.31 ............. 0.0082 ---
2 .815a .59 .... 2.1 z -0.0012 .........
3 .791a .83 .... 1.2 z ............. .0044 0.2443
4 .745a 1.40 .... 1.41 ............ 0.142 -.338 s
5 .663a 1.22 ........................
6 .855 a .84 .... 2.0 x .................
7 .625 a 1.45 .... 2.0 x ............. .007a ---
8 .606 a .95 ................... .0054 -.2932
9 .473a 1.06 ................... .0081 ---
10 .500a .73 ................... .003a ---
Quadratic effects Interactions
Horizontal
Intruder Horizontal Vertical Horizontal Intruder Vertical Speed miss
Subject Closing Slant starting separation separation miss starting miss Predictor x distance Constant
rate range altitude distance distance distance altitude distance length map x of
range regression
map
range
1 ............... 0.5624 0.0013 ............ 5.39
2 -0.574 ............ .36 s ...... 0.027 s --- 0.036 a 6.84
3 ........................... O.OOl 2 --- 5.73
4 ................... .0013 --- .0694 ...... 7.11
5 -1.461 ........................ .00012 --- 4.74
6 ........................... .00012 .0033 6.01
7 .............................. .0592 6.28
8 -1.32 z ........................--- .031s 5.55
9 -.333 --- 0.00012 ..................... --- 6.83
I0 -.282 ...................... .0431 ...... 6.24
*Superscripts show order of inclusion of terms in the regression.
p<O.05.
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